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1. Is Khalid Iqbal Khawar a limited purpose public figure 
because he invited the press to photograph him, granted a 
media interview, and was drawn into a controversy through 
a police investigation and a widely distributed book?
2. Is there clear and convincing evidence to support a finding 
of actual malice when Globe presented the truth to the 
public in its article and relied upon a credible and 
reputable source?
3. Is the appellate court incorrect in its determination that 
the neutral reportage privilege does not exist in 
California?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pre^liminary Statement
On March 14, 1990, Respondent Khalid Iqbal Khawar filed his 
Second Amended Complaint in a defamation suit against Globe 
International, Inc. ("Globe"), Roundtable Publishing, and Robert 
Morrow. (Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 1.) Prior to the trial, 
Respondent settled with Roundtable. See. Khawar v,^ Globe Int'l. 
Inc.■ 51 Cal. App. 4th 14, 21 (2d Dist. 1996). A default was 
entered against Morrow, from whom the plaintiffs sought two 
million dollars. iiL_
On March 25, 1994, the jury returned a Special Verdict.
(J.A. at 593.) The verdict determined that (1) Globe had acted 
negligently in failing to learn whether the statements published 
in their article were false; (2) the statements were defamatory; 
(3) Respondent was a private figure with respect to the events 
surrounding the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy; (4)
1
Globe published the article either knowing that the statements 
were false or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (5)
Globe published the article with malice or oppression. (J.A. at 
594-95.) The jury also found that the article published by Globe 
was an accurate and neutral report of the statements and charges 
made by Morrow in his book, The Senator Must n-ip>. (J.A. at 595.) 
The jury granted Respondent both general damages and in a Special 
Verdict (Phase Two), punitive damages. (J.A. at 596, 598.)
On April 15, 1994, the trial judge reversed the default 
judgment against Morrow, finding that Respondent was not 
identifiable in the book and that the book was not "of or 
concerning" plaintiff Ali Ahmad, (J.A. at 534-35.) The trial 
judge independently found that the photograph in the article was 
the original source of libel because he believed that the 
photograph made Respondent identifiable for the first time.
(J.A. at 521.) On June 5, 1996, the Court of Appeal for the 
Second District, Division Seven, affirmed the decision with 
Justice Gold writing the opinion. See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th 
at 41. This Court granted review on September 25, 1996.
Statement of Facts
On April 4, 1989, Globe published an article written by John 
Blackburn regarding Robert Morrow's book. The .Senator Must Die. 
(J.A. at 148, 583.) The Senator Must Die presents one of the 
many theories concerning the assassination of Senator Robert 
Kennedy. (J.A. at 507, 566.) Morrow wrote that the triggerman 
was not Sirhan B. Sirhan, but rather, a man named Ali Ahmand.
(J.A. at 566.) Morrow also published four pictures in his book
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with the caption: "Ali Ahmand, in sweater, next to Robert 
Kennedy minutes before Kennedy was assassinated. Note SLR 
camera." (J.A. at 579-80.) Following Kennedy's assassination. 
Respondent was interviewed by the Los Angeles Police Department 
and Federal Bureau of Investigation on several occasions. (J.A. 
at 381.) Based upon the police investigation of Respondent, 
Morrow concluded that "Khalid Iqbal" was Ali TUimand. (J.A. at 
576. )
Reporting on the appearance of Morrow's assassination 
theory, the headline of Globe's article stated: "Former CiA 
agpnt riaims: IRANIANS KILLED BOBBY KENNEDY FOR THE MAFIA."
(J.A. at 148.) Appearing below the headline were two 
photographs, one with an arrow directed at the likeness of 
Respondent as he stood on the podium next to Kennedy, the other 
of Sirhan B. Sirhan. (J.A. at 148.) The accompanying caption 
stated: "Author Robert Morrow claims an Iranian agent (arrow),
not Sirhan Sirhan (right), killed Kennedy with a gun disguised to 
look like a camera." (J.A, at 148.)
Jonathan Kirsh, an expert witness retained by Globe, opined 
that the article, "fairly, straightforwardly reports what is 
written and published in that book." (J.A. at 469.) The jury 
agreed and specifically held that the article was an accurate and 
neutral report of the statements and charges made by Morrow in 
The Senator Must Die. (J.A. at 595.) Dissatisfied with the 
jury's findings, the trial judge independently found that Globe 
made Respondent identifiable for the first time by enlarging and 
retouching the photograph. (J.A. at 520.)
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In the early stages of writing the article, John Blackburn 
read the book and interviewed Morrow for details regarding the 
book's content. (J.A. at 318.) Although he has no recollection 
of questioning Morrow's credibility, Blackburn still attempted to 
contact the alleged assassin, Ali Ahmand. (J.A. at 329-30, 350.) 
The managing editor of Globe, Robert Taylor, testified that he 
felt there was no need to investigate Morrow's allegations any 
further. Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 33.
Upon interviewing Morrow, Blackburn was informed that Morrow 
had been linked to the Central Intelligence Agency. (J.A. at 
313.) In addition. Morrow's best selling book. Betrayal. has 
been attributed with helping to create the House Select Committee 
on Assassinations. (J.A. at 220, 517.) Furthermore, Morrow 
participated in a panel discussion of assassination researchers 
regarding his theory on Senator Kennedy's death. (J.A. at 
498-500 . )
Turning to the facts surrounding Kennedy's assassination, 
the subject matter of Morrow's book. Respondent testified that he 
made his way on stage to both report upon the events taking place 
and to be photographed with Kennedy. (J.A. at 369-70.)
Respondent gave a camera to his friend to take the picture.
(J.A. at 370.) Respondent was cognizant of the tremendous media 
attention directed at the stage when he placed himself before the 
flashing cameras of the vast international press corps. (J.A. at 
420-21.) Ten days after the assassination. Time magazine 
published a photograph of Respondent in his yellow sweater as he 
stood next to the Senator. (J.A. at 422.)
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Proud of his own photograph depicting Kennedy and himself 
standing on the podium, Respondent showed the photograph to 
several thousand people. (J.A. at 388-89.) Many of the pictures 
and films from that evening are also broadcast on television, 
year in and year out, to memorialize the assassination of Robert 
Kennedy. (J.A. at 423.) The thousands of photographs taken on 
the night of the assassination are available to the public at the 
California State Archives. (J.A. at 151, 159.) Additionally, 
this long-term public interest in the assassination has yielded 
tables of literature presenting numerous theories on the killing. 
(J.A. at 498.)
Once The Senator Mn.st Die was published and Globe's 
subsequent article came out. Respondent testified that he 
received telephone calls from friends in Bangkok and New Jersey, 
as well as death threats from other unidentifiable sources.
(J.A. at 396.) When Respondent filed this lawsuit, a Bakersfield 
television station provided him with an opportunity for a public 
interview. (J.A. at 398-99, 428.) Respondent accepted the 
invitation, spoke to the press, and the interview was broadcast 
on the evening news. (J.A. at 399, 428.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUT^ENT
Under this Court's totality of the circumstances test, 
Respondent, Khalid Iqbal Khawar, is a limited purpose public 
figure. Respondent voluntarily assumed the risk of injury to his 
reputation when he stood before the flashing cameras of the 
international press corps. As a result. Respondent was 
involuntarily drawn into the controversy through the ensuing
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police investigation and Morrow's book. In order to defend his 
reputation and counter Morrow's theory. Respondent voluntarily 
utilized his access to the media by granting a televised 
interview. The totality of these circumstances makes Respondent 
a limited purpose public figure.
Petitioner did not act with actual malice in publishing the 
article. By including Sirhan B. Sirhan's photograph and 
acknowledging him as the convicted killer. Globe did not 
purposefully or recklessly disregard the truth. Moreover, 
Morrow's connections to the CIA and his congressional 
commendations provide more than enough support for the jury's 
finding that he is a reputable source. Because Morrow is both 
credible and reputable, Globe's failure to conduct a thorough 
investigation is inconsequential.
Finally, the jury also found that the article presented a 
neutral and accurate report of Morrow's conspiracy theory. Whil^ 
Courts of Appeal have yet to explicitly adopt the 
neutral reportage privilege, they have gradually imported its 
rationale into the actual malice test and fair and true report 
privilege. However, several federal circuits, as well as some 
district courts within the Ninth Circuit, have already 
established and applied the neutral reportage privilege. To 
ensure the breathing space required for robust and wide open 
debate on public controversies, the neutral reportage privilege 
should now be adopted in California.
For the reasons as stated herein, this case presents a ripe 
opportunity for this Court to adopt the neutral reportage
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privilege. Furthermore, because Respondent is a limited purpose 
public figure, and Globe did not publish the article with actual 
malice, this Court should reverse the decision of the appellate 
court.
ARGUMENT
I. UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, RESPONDENT IS A
LIMITED PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE BECAUSE HE VOLUNTARILY PLACED 
HIMSELF IN THE PUBLIC EYE, HE WAS INVOLUNTARILY DRAWN INTO 
THE ASSASSINATION CONTROVERSY, AND HE VOLUNTARILY USED HIS 
ACCESS TO THE MEDIA TO DEFEND HIS REPUTATION.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that a public
figure cannot recover damages in a defamation action, unless it
is proved that the defamatory statement was made with actual
malice. See Curtis Publ^g Co. v. Butts. 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967). In Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)
(Powell, J.), the Court examined how one becomes a public figure
and distinguished an "all purpose public figure" from a "limited
purpose public figure." Most commonly, one becomes a limited
purpose public figure when he voluntarily "thrust [s himself] to
the forefront of [a] particular public controvers[y] in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. in
certain rare instances, it "may [also] be possible for someone to
[involuntarily] become a [limited purpose] public figure through
no purposeful action of his own." Id.
In Reader^s Digest Ass'n^ v. Superior Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244,
253 (1984) (Broussard, Acting C.J., expressing the unanimous view
of the Court), this Court summarized the twofold rationale from
Gertz. First, public figures have assumed the risk of injury to
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their reputation by voluntarily placing themselves before the 
public eye. Sea Reader^s Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 253. Second, 
public figures have greater access to the media, which enables 
them to counter any defamatory falsehood made against them. Se^ 
i Utilizing this rationale, this Court has adopted a totality 
of the circumstances test to determine whether someone is a 
limited purpose public figure. See id. at 255. In Reader^ a 
Digest, this Court unanimously held that "such a determination ig 
often a close question which can only be resolved by considering
the totality of the circumstances which comprise each individual 
controversy." id.
The trial court must determine whether a person is a public 
figure as a matter of law. Sfi£. Weingartf^n v. Rlonk. 102 Cal.
App. 3d 129, 134-35 (1st Dist. 1980). Upon review, an appellate 
court must independently examine the entire record de novo to 
ascertain whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
trial court's decision. See. Denney v. Lawrencf^. 22 Cal. App. 4th 
927, 933 (4th Dist. 1994).
Respondent Assumed the Risk of Injury_tQ His Repufatinr)
When He Stood Near Senator Kennedy with the Intpnr 
the International Press Corps Would Photograph Him
Respondent is a limited purpose public figure because he 
assumed the risk of injury to his reputation when he voluntarily 
placed himself before the flashing cameras of the international 
press corps. Moments before Senator Kennedy was assassinated, 
Respondent gave a camera to his friend and then made his way on 
stage to have his picture taken with the Senator. (J.A. at 369,
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370.) Respondent was aware of the tremendous media attention 
focused on Kennedy and he knew that his photograph was being 
taken by the press. (J.A. at 420-21.)
Similarly, in Denney^ the brother of an accused killer 
assumed the risk of injury to his reputation when he provided one 
photograph of himself to the Press-Enterprise newspaper. 22 Cal. 
App. 4th at 931. That newspaper then published the photograph 
and misidentified Roger Denney as the killer. See id. at 932.
The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth District, concluded 
that Denney was a limited purpose public figure, rejecting Roger 
Denney's assertion that he did not place himself in the public 
eye by giving his photograph to the press. See id. at 934, 936.
While Roger Denney provided only one photograph to the 
newspaper; Respondent thrust himself before the flashing cameras 
of the entire international press corps. {J.A. at 420-21.) 
Moreover, Respondent showed his picture with the Senator to 
thousands of people. (J.A. at 388-89.) Consistent with the 
underlying rationale in Denney. Respondent is a limited purpose 
public figure because he assumed the risk of injury to his 
reputation when he placed himself before the throngs of reporters 
photographing Kennedy.
B. Respondent Was Involuntarily Drawn into the Controversy
of Robert Kennedy's Assassination Through the Policta
Investigation and MnrrowVq Rook.
Respondent is a limited purpose public figure because he was 
involuntarily drawn into the controversy regarding Kennedy's 
assassination. Not all matters of public interest which are
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deemed newsworthy are public controversies. See Time^ Tnc. v. 
Firestone/ 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976); see also Hutchinson 
PrQxmire, 443 U.S. ill, 135 (1979) (holding that an issue of 
general public concern is not a controversy). Rather, a "'public^ 
controversy' is any topic upon which sizable segments of society 
have different, strongly held views." Maantaanbuu v. Abernathy. 
816 F. Supp. 218, 223 (S.D.N.Y 1993) (quoting Lei-man v. Flynf 
Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 138 (2d Cir. 1984)). Furthermore, 
the resolution of these strongly held views must impact 
non-participants to the debate. Waldbaum y,. Fairchild
Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. cir. 1980) . When ^ 
public controversy does exist, on certain rare occasions an 
individual may be involuntarily drawn into the controversy and 
become a limited purpose public figure. See Hertz, 418 U.S. at 
345.
1 ■ A. public controversy exists because of the rnhncit
public debate and long-term media attenf-ion
focused on the assassination of Robert Kennedy.
California courts have found an expansive range of issues to 
be public controversies. See Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 
829, 846 (1st Dist. 1996) (finding the debate over earthquake 
disaster mitigation in public schools to be a public 
controversy); Nadel v. Regents of the tJniv. of Cal.. 28 Cal. App. 
4th 1251, 1255, 1269 (1st Dist. 1994) (finding the construction 
of volleyball courts on People's Park in Berkeley to be the 
subject of a public controversy) ; Mn.c;esian v. McClatchy 
New.spapers, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1685, 1700-01 (5th Dist. 1991)
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{finding the debate over who should receive a gambling license 
and whether horse racing should be conducted on Sundays to be 
public controversies); Kaufman v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan 
Ass^n, 140 Cal. App. 3d 913, 917, 921 (4th Dist. 1983) (finding a 
dispute over the re-zoning of property for commercial purposes to 
be a public controversy).
Here, a public controversy over the identity of Senator 
Kennedy's assassin exists. Following the killing, conferences 
were held, panel discussions took place, and theorists 
disseminated literature on the Senator's death. (J.A. at 
498-500.) Moreover the killing of a United States Senator, the 
potential future President of the United States, moments after he 
won the California Primary, impacted the nation. (J.A. at 369.) 
Because of the vibrant debate over the identity of the assassin, 
a public controversy arose in the wake of Kennedy's death.
2. Rpoause of Respondent's.presence Qn_stage. he
heoame the sub-ieot of public inquiry_and was
involuntarily drawn into the controversy.
Occasionally a private individual may be drawn into a public 
controversy, making them an involuntary limited purpose public 
figure. See Gertz. 418 u.s. at 345. In Dameron v^...Washington
Tnc. . 779 F.2d 736, 738, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the air 
traffic controller on duty at Dulles airport at the time of the 
Mt. Weather plane crash, was held to be an involuntary limited 
purpose public figure. The controller. Merle Dameron, was not 
responsible for the plane crash and was exonerated of any 
liability by a federal district court. Sfifi. id. at 738. Yet,
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through no purposeful action of his own, Dameron became the 
subject of an investigation by the National Transportation Safety 
Board. See Dameron. 779 F.2d at 738. Based upon the 
circumstances of the investigation, a researcher and reporter for 
The Washingtonian magazine independently concluded that Dameron 
was responsible for the crash. See id.
Similarly, Respondent happened to be present at the 
Ambassador Hotel when Kennedy was shot. (J.A. at 371.) As a 
result, on several occasions the Los Angeles Police Department 
and Federal Bureau of Investigation interviewed him. (J.A. at 
381.) Like the researcher in Dameron who reviewed the NTSB 
investigations, Morrow reviewed the official police reports.
(J.A. at 576.) Then, like the reporter for The Washingtonian. 
Morrow independently concluded that Respondent killed Kennedy. 
(J.A. at 576.) Thus, through no purposeful action of his own, as 
the subject of public inquiry, Respondent was involuntarily drawn 
into the controversy.
Admittedly, cases are exceedingly rare where individuals are 
found to be involuntary limited purpose public figures. See 
GertZ, 418 U.S. at 345. Nevertheless, in Sipple v- Chronicle 
Publ'g Cq., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1049-50 (1st Dist. 1984), the 
California Court of Appeal for the First District found an 
individual to be such a figure. sippi involved a thwarted 
assassination attempt on United States President Gerald Ford.
154 Cal. App, 3d at 1043. On September 22, 1975, while President 
Ford was visiting San Francisco, Sara Jane Moore attempted to 
shoot him. See id. Oliver Sipple, who was in the crowd.
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"grabbed or struck" Moore's arm before she could kill the 
President. Sipple. 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1043.
Despite no one being certain whether Sipple actually saved 
the President's life, several newspapers speculated that 
President Ford did not thank Sipple for his actions because of 
Sipple's sexual orientation. Sea id. at 1043-44. Sipple 
subsequently sued the San Francisco Chronicle, among other 
newspapers, for invasion of privacy. See id. at 1044. In 
justifying its holding that the articles did not disclose private 
facts, the California Court of Appeal concluded that Sipple was 
an involuntary limited purpose public figure. See id. at 1049.
Interestingly, it was Oliver Sipple's affirmative act of 
grabbing Moore's arm that became the hook which reeled him into 
the controversy. Like Oliver Sipple, it was Respondent's 
affirmative act of making his way on stage and placing himself 
next to Senator Kennedy that caused him to become the subject of 
public inquiry. In Darneron. the air traffic controller was 
involuntarily drawn into the controversy through the 
investigation that surrounded the plane crash and subsequent 
media reports on the incident. 779 F.2d at 738. Like Merle 
Dameron, Respondent was investigated and, through Morrow's book, 
Respondent was made a central figure in the Kennedy assassination 
controversy. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances test, 
Respondent, like Oliver Sipple and Merle Dameron, involuntarily 
became a limited purpose public figure.
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C. By Granting a Televised Interview. Respondent: Proved
That He Had Access to the Media, .Tlirough Which He
Defended His Reputation.
Respondent is a limited purpose public figure because he
%
voluntarily granted an interview to a television station. This 
Court has held that a limited purpose public figure has greater 
access to the media, which enables him to counter any defamatory 
falsehood made against him. See Reader^ g nigeat-, 37 Cal. 3d at 
253; but,..jsee Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, 37 F.3d 1541, 1563 
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that defensive replies to defamatory 
attacks which are made through the media do not transform one 
into a public figure). Once an individual attempts to influence 
public opinion regarding a preexisting controversy by engaging 
in interviews with the press, that individual then becomes a 
limited purpose public figure. S&& Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d 
at 256.
Consistent with this rationale, granting a press interview 
where there is no public controversy does not make one a limited 
purpose public figure. See Firestone. 424 U.S. at 454-55 n.3; 
see also Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134-35 (holding that despite 
Hutchinson's access to the media, without a public controversy he 
did not voluntarily inject himself into a public debate). But 
where a public controversy does exist, and an individual attempts 
to "influence public and media opinion regarding their cause, 
such significant, voluntary efforts to inject oneself into the 
public arena require that such a person or organization be 
classified as a public figure in any related defamation
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actions."^ Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 256 (emphasis added); 
see generally Liu v._Mew York News, 183 A.D.2d 443 (N.Y. 1992); 
Capuano v. Outlet Co., 579 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1990).
Here, Respondent had access to the media as demonstrated by 
his televised interview. (J.A. at 399, 428.) In Street v.
645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir. 1981), the court found that because 
"[t]he press clamored to interview [Victoria Street, s]he clearly 
had access to the media and was able to broadcast her view of the 
events." Similarly, the media approached Respondent for an 
interview and he accepted the opportunity. (J.A. at 399, 428.) 
Thus, Respondent is a limited purpose public figure because he 
utilized his access to the media to defend his reputation in the 
public arena.
This Court has held that once an individual attempts to 
influence public opinion regarding a preexisting controversy by 
engaging in interviews with the press, that individual becomes a 
limited purpose public figure. See Reader'.s Digest. 37 Cal. 3d 
at 256. In Reader's Digest, Synanon Church, a drug 
rehabilitation organization turned alternative life-style 
community, sent out letters to the media and engaged in a 
publicity campaign. Id. at 255-56. This Court determined that
^ "Radio or television appearances have often been cited as a 
factor in finding the plaintiff to be a public figure ... as 
has granting interviews to the press .... Likewise, where the 
plaintiff made an effort to avoid press contact, many courts have 
cited this as a reason for refusing to find the plaintiff a 
public figure." Tracy A. Bateman, Who is "Public: Figiirp" fn-r 
Purposes of Defamation Action. 19 A.L.R. 5th 1, 60-62 (1995).
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these attempts to influence the media and preserve the Church's
reputation, "went far beyond defensive litigation." Reader's 
Digest/ 37 Cal. 3d at 255. Thus, this Court held that Synanon's 
publicity campaign provided them with access to the media, and as 
such, they voluntarily became public figures for the purposes of 
the litigation. See id. at 256.
Several of the courts of appeal in California have liberally 
applied this "media access" rationale. In Deanfiy, the Court of 
Appeal of California, Fourth District, held that when an 
individual gives a press interview, it must be deemed that he did 
so voluntarily. 22 Cal. App. 4th at 935. In that case, Roger 
Denney, the brother of a man accused of killing his wife, granted 
only two press interviews. Saa id. The court held that Roger 
Denney voluntarily injected himself into the public controversy 
surrounding the charge that his brother was a murderer. id.
at 936.
Similarly, in Rudnick v 11nn, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1183,
1187 (2d Dist. 1994) , the Court of Annfaai ^ - ^ r- jwuic oc Appeal of California, Second
District, held that where a rancheridler merely contacted one reports
to write an article and assisted u , , ^ .oxai-ea another who had contacted him,
these actions alone made the rancher a •iiex a limited purpose public
figure. In that case, Marcus RudnirV .2 . , , .nick wanted to defend himself
against accusations that he was resnnn<=iKi ^ .esponsible for the degradation
of the public land preserve where his cattlo ...cattle grazed. See id. T(
broadcast his cause, Rudnick gave tour*? .yavc tours of the land preserve to
the two reporters, whereupon both wrotf* •.t' wtn wrote articles promoting
Rudnick's view. Saa Thus, by makinfr .y making simply two attempts to
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Similarly, in this case Respondent gave a television 
interview. (J.A. at 399, 428.) Like Roger Denney who defended 
his brother, and Marcus Rudnick who defended his reputation, 
Respondent was at the center of a public controversy and he used 
the media to defend himself. (J.A. at 566.) Unlike Synanon 
Church, Respondent did not engage in a long-term publicity 
campaign to save his reputation. Rather, Respondent granted only 
one interview. (J.A. at 399, 428.) According to Rudnick and 
npnneyr however, minimal contacts with the media are still 
sufficient to render an individual a limited purpose public 
figure.
The rationale underlying Reader's Digest. Rudnick, and
Denney applies when the individual has made only one attempt to
defend his reputation through the media.
Where the plaintiff used the media to respond to the 
defamation . . . courts have considered this to be
important, given the Gertz court's reasoning that 
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater 
access to the channels of effective communication and 
thus have a more realistic opportunity to counteract 
false statements than private individuals.
Tracy A. Bateman, Who is "Public Rigure" for Purposes of
Defamation Action. 19 A.L.R. 5th 1, 63 (1995) .
Respondent went beyond seeking redress in the court system.
Had Respondent only rebutted Morrow's allegations in court, and
use the media to defend his reputation, Rudnick made himself a
limited purpose public figure. See Rudnick, 25 Cal. App. 4th at
1187.
not granted the press an interview, he may have precluded a
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finding that he is a public figure. See Wolarnn v.
Digest Ass^n. 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). For instance, ”[i]n 
GertZ/ the attorney . . . never discussed the litigation with the 
press, and limited his participation in the civil litigation 
solely to his representation of a private client." Wo1ston. 443 
U.S. at 167. Unlike the subject of the defamation in Gert?.. 
Respondent did not limit the defense of his reputation to the 
confines of the judicial system, rather. Respondent spoke to the 
media. (J.A. at 399, 428.)
Under this Court's totality of the circumstances test, 
Respondent is a limited purpose public figure. First, Respondent 
assumed the risk of injury to his reputation when he stood before 
the flashing cameras of the international press corps. (J.A. at 
420-21.) Second, Respondent became the subject of the police 
investigation and a subsequent conspiracy theory, drawing him 
into the public controversy surrounding Kennedy's assassination. 
Third, by granting the interview. Respondent proved that he had 
access to the media to counter Morrow's allegation that he was 
the true assassin of Robert Kennedy. According to this Court's 
holding in Reader's Digest, "such voluntary efforts to inject 
oneself into the public arena require that such a person or 
organization be classified as a public figure in any related 
defamation actions." 37 Cal. 3d at 256 (Broussard, Acting C.J., 
expressing the unanimous view of the Court) (emphasis added).
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II. GLOBE DID NOT ACT WITH ACTUAL MALICE BECAUSE THE ARTICLE
PRESENTED THE TRUTH AND THE EDITORS RELIED UPON A CREDIBLE 
AND REPUTABLE SOURCE.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a public 
figure cannot recover damages unless it is proved upon clear and 
convincing evidence that the defamatory statement was made with 
actual malice. See Gertz. 418 U.S. at 342, 349. Furthermore, 
this Court has explicitly stated that the federal standard for 
actual malice must also be met for a private individual to 
recover presumed or punitive damages when the speech involves a 
matter of public concern. Sae. Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co.. 48 Cal. 
3d 711, 747 (1989) . Any publication made "with knowledge that 
[the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not" constitutes actual malice. New York Timpg 
Cn V. Snllivan. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
"The critical issue is the publisher's actual belief as to 
the truth or falsity of the statements made, which is a 
subjective test." Antonovich v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 
1041, 1047 (2d Dist. 1991). Under this subjective test for 
actual malice, "[tlhere must be sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts 
as to the truth of his publication." Id. (quoting St. Amant v 
Thompson. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
Although the actual malice test is subjective, 
circumstantial evidence, such as failing to investigate or 
relying upon noncredible sources, may also indicate actual 
malice. See Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 257-58. Yet a 
failure to investigate, by itself, will not be sufficient to
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prove actual malice. See Reader^ s DiyestL. 37 Cal. 3d at 258; iiUt.
cf^ Harte-Hanks Communications._InC. V. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 692 (1909) (stating that ^purposeful avoidance of the truth 
is in a different category"). This Court has noted that if the 
source of the article is reputable, a failure to investigate is 
inconsequential. Reader^ s Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 259.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit has held 
that actual malice cannot be proven merely by asserting that a 
publisher failed to contact the subject of his work. See 
Eastwood v. National Enquirer, No. 96-55560, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22628, at *16 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 1997). The Ninth Circuit has 
emphatically stated that even an extreme departure from 
reasonably prudent conduct and commonly accepted journalistic 
standards will not suffice to prove actual malice. See Newton v. 
NBC, 930 F.2d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 1990).
An appellate court must exercise de novo review and 
independently assess the entire record for clear and convincing 
proof of actual malice. See McCoy v. Hearst Corp.^ 42 Cal. 3d 
835, 842 (1986). Because a finding of actual malice can infringe 
upon First Amendment rights, the trier of fact's determinations 
are not binding. See id. at 844. "In a similar vein, this 
[Cjourt agrees [that] . . . [tjhere is a greater danger that the 
jury will ignore the limits of the First Amendment, find for the 
plaintiff out of sympathy, or find against the defendant out of 
hostility to speech that ought to be protected." Id. at 844 n.6.
The appellate court's finding, in this case, is in direct 
conflict with the constitutional protections as set forth in New
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York Times, and further secured by this Court in Reader's Digest. 
The opinion below launches into its actual malice analysis by 
stating that "the article is not merely false but glaringly 
false." Khawar. 51 Cal. App. 4th at 32. Despite Justice Gold's 
observation, Supreme Court precedent indicates that "[erroneous] 
statement is inevitable in free debate and . . . must be 
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.'" Reader's 
Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 261 (quoting New York Times. 376 U.S. at 
271-72).
The opinion below next submits that the author of the copy, 
John Blackburn, failed to contact the subject of Morrow's book. 
gee Khawar. 51 Cal. App. 4th at 30. However, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that actual malice cannot be proven merely by asserting 
that a publisher failed to contact the subject of his work. £££ 
Kasr.wood. No. 96-55560, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22628, at *16. 
Moreover, "failure to investigate before publishing, even when a 
reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient 
to establish reckless disregard." Antonovich. 234 Cal. App. 3d 
at 1048. The reasoning is,
[a] non-fiction work often details events that are long 
past and describes people who are unavailable to verify 
the author's statements. To require a book publisher 
to check, as a matter of course, every potentially 
defamatory reference might raise the price of 
non-fiction works beyond the resources of the average 
man.^ This result would, we think, produce just such a
^ In the opinion below the appellate court suggested that 
Globe should have retained a private investigator to locate Ali
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chilling effect on the free flow of ideas as First
Amendment jurisprudence has sought to avoid.
"Naantaanbuu. 816 F. Supp. at 228. Here, the issue before this 
Court is whether the editors of Globe purposefully avoided the 
truth or knew that Morrow's allegations as republished in the 
article were false. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
A. Globe Did Not Make a Deliberate Decision to
Euxposefullv Avoid the Truth: Rather. Globe Presented 
■tile Truth bv including Sirhan B. Sirhan's Photograpli
the Article and Identifying Him Ag Kennedy's Killer.
Globe did not purposefully avoid the truth because the 
article contained a picture of Sirhan B, Sirhan and identified 
him as Kennedy's killer. (J.A. at 148.) Moreover, there is no 
direct evidence indicating that the editors of Globe made a 
deliberate decision to purposefully avoid the truth. See 
generally Khawar, 5i Cal. App. 4th at 32-33. The testimony of 
the editors established that they merely failed to investigate 
Morrow's allegations, but there is no direct evidence that they 
made a deliberate decision to avoid the truth. See id. Rather, 
the managing editor, Robert Taylor, testified that he believed 
there was no need to investigate Morrow's story. See -i d, at 33, 
Not having a need to investigate is distinguishable from a 
deliberate decision to purposefully avoid the truth.
The facts from Antonovirh demonstrate an example of the 
direct evidence required to show a deliberate decision to avoid 
the truth. 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1053. In that case, Antonovich 
had accused his political rival. Ward, of removing or destroying-
Ahmand. See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 29-30.
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the city's files. See Antonovich. 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1044. At 
a political debate Ward confronted Antonovich about his 
allegations and offered to submit exculpatory proof that he did 
not remove or destroy the files. See id. at 1053. Antonovich 
made a deliberate decision to avoid the truth by rejecting this 
opportunity and, on later occasions, he repeated the allegations. 
See id.
Here, there is no direct evidence in the record to indicate 
that the editors rejected the truth. See generally Khawar, 51 
Cal. App. 4th at 32-33. Rather, the article presents the truth 
by identifying Sirhan B. Sirhan as Kennedy's killer. (J.A. at 
148.) Likewise, the testimony of the managing editor indicates 
that he believed there was no need to investigate Morrow's 
allegations. See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 33. The 
circumstantial evidence in this case does not create the bridge 
needed to link a failure to investigate with a deliberate 
decision to avoid the truth.
Assuming the editors had decided to investigate, the 
evidence available to the public would only reaffirm information 
that the editors already knew, that Sirhan B. Sirhan has been 
convicted of killing Kennedy. See id. at 32. Because Morrow's 
source for his theory was dead, there was no way to confirm his 
research. (J.A. at 148.) Had Blackburn contacted the alleged 
assassin, namely Respondent, it stretches the imagination to 
assume that he would do anything but deny his role in the killing 
even if he truly was the killer. While there is evidence that 
the editors felt that there was no need to investigate, there is
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nothing in the record to suggest that they deliberately and 
purposefully avoided the truth. See generally Khawar. 51 Cal. 
App. 4th at 32-33. The editors failed to investigate, but the 
failure was not the product of a deliberate decision to avoid the 
truth. See id.
B. Because Morrow Has Been Linked to the CIA and
Received Commendations From Congress, the Jury Had
Support for Its Finding That He Is a Reputable Source^
Making Globe's Failure to Investigate Inconsequential.
The publishing of Robert Morrow's allegations does not 
require investigation because Robert Morrow himself is a credible 
source. See Reader's Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 259. From this 
Court's holding in Reader's Digest, it is clear that, "[a] 
publisher does not have to investigate personally, but may rely 
on the investigation and conclusions of reputable sources." Id. 
Robert Morrow has several characteristics that establish him as a 
reputable source. First, Morrow has engaged in covert operations 
linked to the Central Intelligence Agency as evidenced by his 
conviction for counterfeiting Cuban pesos. {J.A. at 226-27.) 
Second, Morrow has written three books on assassination theories 
which have been published and widely distributed. (J.A. at 218, 
224, 517, 583.) Third, Morrow's book. Betrayal, has been 
commended by Congress for its fundamental contribution to the 
creation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. (J.A, 
at 220.)
Robert Morrow has been identified by the publisher of one of 
his previous books as being both a "contract agent" and a "senior 
C.I.A. agent." (J.A. at 224-25.) His links to the Central
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counterfeiting Cuban pesos. (J.A. at 228.) Morrow's
codefendant, Mario Kohly, presented a letter in those proceedings
written on his behalf by former Vice President Richard Nixon.
(J.A. at 227-28.) Richard Nixon, the future President of the
United States of America, wrote:
[T]he acts which lead to [Kohly's] conviction, although 
unlawful, were not motivated by any desire for personal 
gain, but rather from a dedication to his country. . .
[I]t is possible that, in the face of a difficult, 
dangerous, and challenging situation, the complexities 
of the United State's policy toward the Castro regime, 
particularly as it has affected the exiles, might well 
have created the atmosphere in which a person such as 
[Kohly] could honestly, though mistakenly, believe that 
actions such as those for which he was convicted were 
not contrary to the interest of the United States. . .
The exiles have . . . been encouraged and aided by
the United States in efforts to overthrow the Cuban 
government.
(J.A. at 230-31.) As demonstrated by Morrow's close connections 
to an individual directly linked to the highest powers in the 
United States government. Morrow is a reputable source on subject 
matter concerning covert operations.
Not only do Robert Morrow's connections establish his 
credibility, but also, his success as a widely published author 
further confirms his expertise in assassination theories.
Morrow's first book. Betrayal, exposing an assassination theory 
regarding President John F. Kennedy's killing, was a bestseller. 
(J.A. at 517.) In publishing The Senator Must Die. Roundtable 
produced 25,000 copies for sale to the public. (J.A. at 517.) 
Finally, in early June of 1993 at a conference on the
Intelligence Agency derive from his 1965 conviction for
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assassinations of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther 
King, Morrow participated in a panel discussion on Robert 
Kennedy's death alongside other assassination researchers. (J.A. 
at 498, 500.) fiee Reader's Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 258-59 (finding 
a professor and author to be a reputable source). Because Morrow 
is a best-selling author who is recognized as an authority on 
assassinations, he is both reputable and credible. (J.A. at 498, 
500, 517.)
The strongest endorsement of Robert Morrow's credibility 
comes not from the public's demand for his work, but from 
Congress itself. Congressman Thomas Downing has bestowed direct 
praise on Robert Morrow in recognition of his indispensable role 
in creating the House Select Committee on Assassinations. (J.A. 
219-20.) In a letter to Morrow, Downing wrote, ''[i]t is no 
exaggeration to say that the information in rBetrayall, coupled 
with additional confidential material supplied to me by Mr.
Morrow, helped make the creation of the House Select Committee on 
Assassinations possible." (J.A. at 220.) This congressional 
commendation, along with Morrow's high government connections and 
successful publishing endeavors, provides more than sufficient 
evidence for this Court to affirm the jury's finding that Morrow 
is a reputable source.
In summation, a finding of actual malice is simply not 
supported by the evidence. Globe did not recklessly or 
purposefully avoid the truth; rather, the article included a 
photograph of Sirhan B. Sirhan and identified him as the 
convicted killer. (J.A. at 148.) Furthermore, because Globe
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republished the allegations of a reputable source, a finding of 
actual malice based entirely upon a failure to conduct a thorough 
investigation is plain error. By presenting two alternative 
theories to Kennedy's assassination, Globe enabled the public to 
debate for themselves and determine where the real truth lies. 
Because ''[erroneous] statement is inevitable in free debate [it].
. . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have 
the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.'"
Reader's Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 261 (quoting New York Times, 376 
U.S. at 271-72).
III. THE FACTS OF THIS CASE ARE RIPE FOR THIS COURT TO EXPRESSLY 
ADOPT THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE TO PROTECT ROBUST AND 
WIDE OPEN DEBATE ON PUBLIC CONTROVERSIES.
This Court should expressly adopt a neutral reportage
privilege to allow the press the "breathing space," free from the
daunting threat of litigation, so that debate on public issues
can remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide open." The Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, has stated that "[t]he public interest
in being fully informed about controversies that often rage
around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the
freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility
for them." Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d
113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977).
In Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 
113 (2d Cir.) . . , the Second Circuit elucidated for 
the first time a constitutional privilege of neutral 
reportage, under which a republisher who accurately and 
disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements 
made against public figures is shielded from liability.
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regardless of the republisher's subjective awareness of 
the truth or falsity of the accusation.
Barry v. Time, Inc. / 584 F. Supp. mo, 1123 (n.d. Cal. 1984).
Following the lead of the Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit
has also adopted a neutral reportage privilege. See Price v.
Viking Eenguin. Inc./ 88I F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989); sse
alSQ In re UPI^ 106 B.R. 323, 331 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1989) (adopting
the neutral reportage privilege in the District of Columbia
Circuit for the first time). In Price, the court held that even
harmful statements made by public bodies, if republished
accurately, are protected. 881 F.2d at 1429, 1434. For the
neutral reportage privilege to apply, the journal must act in
good faith, accurately report, and may not concur in the charges
made by others. See id. at 1434.
One function of the neutral reportage privilege is to allow
a republisher to report upon a newsworthy charge made by a
declarant. In reporting these charges, even when done accurately
and neutrally, one must often repeat the defamatory statement.
R.W.C., Note, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage. 
69 Va. L. Rev. 853, 867 (1983). "In many cases the public has an 
interest in knowing that a certain individual made a particular 
charge. It is logically impossible to convey such information 
without republishing the charge itself." Id.
The neutral reportage privilege applies when "the otherwise 
defamed person is (1) a public figure^ (2) involved in an 
existing public controversy, (3) the defamatory statement is made
^ But see discussion infra p. 34.
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by a person to that controversy and (4) is republished accurately 
and neutrally." Crane v. Arizona Republic. 729 F. Supp. 698, 710 
(C.D. Cal. 1989). Although the district court did not apply the 
privilege in Crane. in justifying the neutral reportage doctrine 
the court stated that the privilege "serves to promote freedom to 
report statements regarding public controversies which involve
public figures." Id. at 711.
A. California Has Already Used the Rationale of the
Mentral Reportage Privilege Within the Actual Malice
TPflt and Fair and True Report Privilege.
In looking at the progeny of Edwards within California, the 
case law indicates that California courts are gradually accepting 
the neutral reportage privilege. For instance, in Weingarten, 
addressing the issue of neutral reports of inaccurate 
information, the court stated that ”[a]Ithough accuracy and 
objectivity in reporting are goals for which all responsible news 
media strive, the protection of the First Amendment is not 
limited to statements whose validity are beyond question or which 
reflect an objective picture of the reported events." 102 Cal. 
App. 3d at 151.
In that case, Saul Weingarten was subject to accusations 
questioning his integrity as a City Attorney. See ilL. at 142. 
After his dismissal, the publishers of a local newspaper 
published a story in which they implied that Weingarten's ethics 
were badly wanting. See id. at 140. Their sources, Ehrman and 
Murray, charged Weingarten with using the powers of his office to 
profit through illegal real estate transactions. See id. at 148.
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The California Court of Appeal found that the newspaper was 
not liable because there was no actual malice. See id. at 150.
In their determination the court used the underlying rationale 
for the neutral reportage privilege, veiled behind the actual 
malice analysis. The court found no malice because of the simple 
finding that "every statement [in the article] has been traced to 
an identifiable source." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that 
the statements were newsworthy merely because they had been made.
id. at 148. Essentially, the court shielded the newspaper 
for republishing harmful accusations because they were not the 
original source of the statements. The court was pushing the 
boundaries of the actual malice standard by protecting those who 
neutrally and accurately republish a defamatory falsehood that 
is, in and of itself, newsworthy.
The actual malice standard has long protected those who 
mistakenly publish defamatory falsehoods. See Mew York Times.
376 U.S. at 267. Weingarfen demonstrates that the language of 
the actual malice test neglects a class of people who deserve 
First Amendment protection, namely those who are neutrally and 
accurately republishing known defamatory falsehoods.
There was no evidence in the record to support these allegations,
yet, the newspaper republished them. See Weingarten. 102 Cal.
App. 3d at 140, 148.
Weingarten*s acknowledgment of the neutral reportage
privilege is demonstrated by its citation to Edwards. the
premiere case on the privilege:
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The First Amendment protects the reporting of charges 
against a public official or figure 'regardless of the 
reporters private views regarding their validity. What 
is newsworthy about such accusations was that they were 
made. We do not believe that the press may be required 
under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy 
statements merely because it has serious doubts 
regarding their truth.
Weingarten. 102 Cal. App, 3d at 148 (quoting Edwards, 556 F.2d at 
120). The appearance of this language in a California case shows 
that California has already begun to incorporate the neutral 
reportage privilege.
Three short years later, the Fourth District, Court of 
Appeal applied California's statutory privilege for "fair and 
true reports" to protect a known defamatory falsehood made 
against a public official. According to California Civil Code 
section 47, "[a] fair and true report of a judicial proceeding is 
privileged." Grille v. Smithy 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 873 (4th 
Dist. 1983). In Grillo, a Los Angeles Times article reported 
upon Municipal Court Judge Joseph Grille, who detained a county 
transportation official for a contempt hearing. Id. at 871.
Grille was attempting to avoid "red tape" in obtaining airline 
tickets. See id. at 871. in reporting upon this event the Timp^s 
used such words as: "angry", "shouted", "stormed", and "kangaroo 
court." Id. at 868. The court held that these words were 
statements of opinion as a matter of law. See at 871. 
Moreover, despite the contentious nature of these words, the 
court found that these utterances, as well as a "red tape" 
statement made out of context, were also privileged as a "fair 
and true" report under California law. See id. at 873.
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while the singular words were found to be opinion, the fact 
that the "red tape" statement was made by Grille was found to 
have supportive evidence. Set> Gr-illn. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 871.
The court found that accurately reporting upon a public 
official's statement during a judicial proceeding is privileged. 
Sfig xd. at 873. Then, the court expounded upon this idea to 
include that even a known falsehood may be reported upon so long 
as the report is "fair and true." See id. "Thus, a fair and 
true report of a known falsehood concerning a private citizen 
uttered in a judicial proceeding is not actionable."^ Xd-.- Thus, 
in Grillo, the California Court of Appeal incorporated the 
neutral reportage privilege under section 47, the "fair and true 
report privilege," because they found that under certain 
circumstances one can knowingly publish a defamatory utterance 
made in a judicial proceeding. Id. This finding is an important 
distinction in defining what a fair and true report is. That a
In recognition of the grave importance in granting the press 
the freedom to provide the public with information regarding 
newsworthy events, the California legislature has already adopted 
a fair and true report privilege. California Civil Code section 
47(d) protects: "a fair and true report in, or a communication 
to, a public journal, of (A) a judicial, (B) legislative, or (C) 
other public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in the 
course thereof, or (E) of a verified charge or complaint made by 
any person to a public official, upon which complaint a warrant 
has been issued." Cal. Civ. Code § 47(d) (West 1997) . Section 
47(e) protects: "a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings 
of a public meeting, if the meeting was lawfully convened for a 
lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication of 
the matter complained of was for the public benefit." Cal. Civ. 
Code § 47(e) (West 1997).
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true report can be made on a known falsehood demonstrates a great 
similarity between the meanings of "fair and true" and "neutral 
and accurate." "Fair and true" after Grillo no longer hinges 
upon knowing whether the statement which is reported upon is true 
or false, but rather on the accuracy of the reporting.
B. Several Courts,—including District Courts Within thp
Ninth Circuit. Are Adopting and Utilizing the Neutral
Reportage Privilege to Protect the Republication of
Known Defamatory Falsehoods, Even in Cases Involving
Private Individual «■
District courts within the Ninth Circuit have adopted a free 
standing neutral reportage privilege, independent of the 
constraints of the actual malice test and fair comment privilege, 
to extend constitutional protection to those who neutrally and 
accurately republish a known defamatory falsehood. See Barry.
584 F. Supp. at 1127; Ward v. News Group Tnt'l. T.td., 733 F.
Supp. 83, 84 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (protecting Globe under the neutral 
reportage privilege). In Barry, Judge Patel rejected the 
rationale behind Dickey v. CBS Inn., 583 F.2d 1221 (3rd Cir.
1978) , the leading federal case against the adoption of the 
neutral reportage privilege. See Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1124. 
Judge Patel held that neither, "Gertz, St. Amant or any other 
Supreme Court pronouncement precludes recognition of the [neutral 
reportage] privilege." Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1124. Judge Patel 
concluded that the public's interest in obtaining information 
pertaining to a public controversy requires that liability not be 
placed upon those who republish a known defamatory falsehood.
See id.
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This Court has pointed out that the fair and true report
privilege under California Civil Code section 47 does not 
expressly protect the right to make false statements about purely 
private individuals on matters of public interest. fiee Brown, 
Cal. 3d at 719. In Brown, Kelly Broadcasting Company ran a new^ 
story in which they portrayed Shirley Brown, a contractor, to b^ 
incompetent at her work. Id^ at 720. Willis, the reporter for 
Kelly Broadcasting, made the initial allegations that Brown's 
work was "shoddy." See isL. at 719. Kelly also broadcast a 
second story in which another contractor was criticized, yet th^t 
contractor appeared on the show to defend himself. See id.
This Court held that the fair and true report privilege di(;j 
not extend to protecting defamatory statements made against 
Shirley Brown, a private figure. S&s. What Brown does not
is address the republishing of statements, the fundamental 
element of the neutral reportage privilege. This discussion in 
Brown of the fair and true report privilege should not constrairi 
this Court from establishing a neutral reportage privilege that 
applies to private figures. In Law Firm of Daniel p. FostP-r,
E.C. V. Turner Broad. System. Inc.. 844 F.2d 955, 961 (2d Cir. 
1988), the Second Circuit suggested that it is "arguably an 
extension of Edwards to apply [the neutral reportage privilege] 
to litigation brought by a private figure involved in a matter of 
public concern." See..alsQ April v. Reflectnr--Herald. Tnr,. 546 
N.E,2d 466, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the neutral 
reportage privilege applies when the plaintiff is a private 
figure).
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By adopting the neutral reportage privilege, this Court will 
properly balance the right of the press to foster public debate 
with the individual's right to recover for damages to his or her 
reputation. Under the neutral reportage privilege the 
individual's right to recover is not barred because the privilege 
only shields the republisher, not the original defamer from a 
libel action. Commentators have noted that "the neutral 
reportage privilege in no way affects the ability of the 
individual defamed to pursue a defamation action against the 
original publisher. . . . [T]he original publisher will be
liable for the full extent of any reasonably foreseeable harm." 
Mark W. Page, Note, Price v. Viking Penguin. Inc.: The Neutral 
Reportage Privilege and Robust. Wide Open Debate. 75 Minn. L.
Rev. 157, 197 (1990).
California has been incorporating the neutral reportage 
privilege, though not always by name, for almost two decades. 
Pdwards established the privilege in the Second Circuit in 1977, 
and since then California has repeatedly imported the language 
and rationale from this landmark decision. In Weingarten, the 
California Court of Appeal utilized the rationale of the neutral 
reportage privilege veiled behind the actual malice test. 
Similarly, in Grillo, the California Court of Appeal veiled the 
neutral reportage privilege behind the fair and true report 
privilege. In Barry and Ward, two Federal District Courts within 
the Ninth Circuit adopted and applied the neutral reportage 
privilege. This Court now has the opportunity to drop the veil 
and establish the neutral reportage privilege in California.
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Because an individual can always seek redress from the original 
source of the defamation, the neutral reportage privilege need 
not distinguish between public and private individuals.
C. The Evidence Supports the Jury's Finding That Globe
Meutrallv and Accurately Reported Morrow^s Allegations.
The facts of this case are ripe for this Court to expressly 
adopt the neutral reportage privilege because Globe neutrally and 
accurately republished Morrow's allegations. Morrow's book 
presents one of the many theories surrounding the assassination 
of Senator Kennedy. (J.A. at 507, 566.) Morrow wrote that the 
triggerman was not Sirhan B. Sirhan, but rather, a man named Ali 
Ahmand. {J.A. at 566.) The book also contained four pictures
with the caption: "Ali Ahmand in sweater, next to Robert Kennedy 
minutes before Kennedy was assassinated. Note SLR camera."
(J.A. at 151, 159, 579-80.)
The headline of Globe's article stated: "Formpr CIA agent 
claims: IRANIANS killed bobby KENNEDY FOR THE MAFIA." (J.A. at 
148.) Two photographs appeared below the headline, one with an 
arrow directed at the likeness of respondent as he stood on the 
podium next to Kennedy, the other of Sirhan B. Sirhan. (J.A. at 
148.) The accompanying caption states: "Author Robert Morrow 
claims an Iranian agent (arrow), not Sirhan Sirhan (right), 
killed Kennedy with a gun disguised to look like a camera."
(J.A. at 148.)
In this case. Globe merely published an article presenting 
Morrow's theory on the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
Jonathan Kirsh, an expert retained by Globe, testified that the
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published in that book." (J.A. at 469.) Consequently, the jury
specifically found that the article was an accurate and neutral
report of the statements and charges made by Morrow, (J.A. at
595.) According to the jury instructions given by the trial
judge, in reaching the determination that the article was an
accurate and neutral report, the jury had to, and thus did find:
1) that Robert D, Morrow is a responsible and 
prominent source; 2) that the statements or claims 
reported on were newsworthy; 3) that the report 
neutrally and accurately conveys the statements;
4) that the report did not espouse or concur in the 
charges made; and 5) that the publisher believes 
reasonably and in good faith, that his or her report 
accurately conveys the statements made.
(J.A. at 64.)
In reviewing the jury's determination that the article was a 
neutral and accurate report, Edwards states that the appropriate 
standard of review is whether or not the jury's finding of fact 
was clearly erroneous. 556 F.2d at 120. "Implicit in the jury's 
verdict ... is the finding, which we must accept that the Times 
accurately reported [the accusations]." Id. (emphasis added). 
Edwards held that a rejection of the jury's finding of fact is 
"constitutionally impermissible." Id.
article "fairly, straightforwardly reports what is written and
In this case, the jury found Globe's article to be a neutral
and accurate report of Morrow's allegations. The facts of this
case are ripe for this Court to expressly adopt the neutral
reportage privilege in California. To do otherwise would deprive
the public of newsworthy information about raging public
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controversies. Ultimately, society must be trusted to determine
for themselves whether a statement is "true.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Globe International, 
Inc. respectfully requests this Court to find that Respondent is 
a limited purpose public figure and that Globe did not act with 
actual malice. Petitioner also requests this Court to expressly 
adopt the neutral reportage privilege and reverse the judgment of 
the appellate court.
Dated: October 30, 1997
Seth M. Gerber
William M. Sloan
Counsel for Petitioner 
Globe International, Inc.
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